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LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE AGAINST
CIVIL AERIAL INTRUDERS: THE DESTRUCTION OF KAL
FLIGHT 007 IN COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1983, a jet fighter of the Soviet Air Defense
Forces' shot down a Korean Airlines Boeing 7472 which had strayed
into Soviet airspace.3 The aircraft crashed into the Sea of Japan and
the 269 persons aboard perished.4 This note will examine the Soviet
claim that the destruction of the Korean airliner was a lawful act taken
in defense of sovereign Soviet airspace,5 in conformity with article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations6 and with states' practice and
opinion, and in conformity with the expression of community norms as
established from prior incidents regarding the use of force against in-
truding civil airliners. 7
The focus of this note will be external. The Soviet Union has con-
1. The Air Defense Forces are a separate branch of the Soviet military devoted solely
to the protection of Soviet airspace. See VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR [GA-
ZE TE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR] No. 48, item 891 (1982) (LAW ON THE STATE
BOUNDARY OF THE U.S.S.R.), in COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND UNION REPUB-
LICS (W. Butler ed. & trans. 1979), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1055 (1983). Article 27 pro-
vides: "The protection of the USSR state boundary on land, sea, rivers, lakes and other
waters shall be entrusted to the border guard and in airspace, to the Anti-Aircraft De-
fense Forces .... " Id. at 1065-66. The airliner was shot down by a Soviet SU-15 inter-
ceptor under the air defense command at Sakhalin Island. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1983, at
Al, col. 6.
2. The airliner, Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 007, operated five times a week be-
tween New York and Seoul. Statement of Mr. Kim, Permanent Observer of the Republic
of Korea to the United Nations, 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at , U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2470 (1983),
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1114 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Kim Statement].
3. At approximately 1600 hours Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), the airliner strayed
into Soviet airspace over Kamchatka Peninsula. From that time on it was monitored on
radar by Soviet military authorities. The airliner remained in Soviet airspace until it was
destroyed by the Soviet interceptor at 1826 hours GMT. See Letter of Charles Lichen-
stein, Acting Permanent Representative of the United States, to the President of the
United Nations Security Council, 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at , U.N. Doc S/15947 (1983), re-
printed in 22 I.L.M. 1109 (1983).
4. The passengers included 47 Americans, 44 Chinese, 28 Japanese, 15 Filipinos, six
Thais, four Australians, one Swede, one Indian, one Canadian and one whose nationality
has not been determined. The 29 crew members were nationals of South Korea. Kim
Statement, supra note 2, at 1114.
5. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1984, at A12, cols. 3-4.
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
7. See infra notes 76, 78, 79, 107, 110, 125.
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ducted an internal investigation and concluded that the Defense
Forces acted in conformity with Soviet border law.' A claim of lawful-
ness under international law, however, is subject to examination by the
community of nations regarding the act's conformity with community-
recognized prescriptions and expectations.'
At the request of the United States,"0 the Republic of Korea,1 Ca-
nada, 1 Australia" and Japan,"4 a special session of the United Nations
Security Council concerning the tragedy was convened on September 2,
1983.15 The world community condemned the Soviet Union for its use
8. At a rare press conference in Moscow held on September 9, 1983, Marshall
Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff, stated that the Defense Forces acted:
in quick compliance with the constitutional rights and laws on border protection.
Protection of the borders, including a sovereign country's airspace, is a sovereign
right of each government. The Soviet military forces protecting the peaceful la-
bor of the Soviet Union are always at a high level of military preparedness and
during the entire history of the Soviet Government they've always honorably
fulfilled their duties. And, if necessary, they will execute their missions and will
accomplish their combat missions correctly.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1983, at A4, cols. 5-6. The statements at the press conference were
made in reliance "on the facts and conclusions presented by the commission." Id. at col.
1. The Soviet Union established an investigation commission on the incident, which in-
cluded "responsible specialists and experts of different departments, in particular, the
State Aviation inspection of the U.S.S.R." Id.
9. See M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 219
(1963); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 320-21 (5th ed. 1955).
10. See Lichenstein Letter, supra note 3. The United States took the position that
"this unprovoked resort to the use of force by the Soviet military authorities in contra-
vention of international civil aviation organization standards and the basic norms of in-
ternational law must be deplored and condemned by the international community and
by world public opinion." Id. at 1110.
11. See Letter from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/15948 (1983), reprinted
in 22 1.L.M. 1111 (1983). South Korea strongly condemned "this unprovoked barbaric act
committed by the Soviet Union in blatant violation of basic norms of international law
and practice in international civil aviation . . . ." Id.
12. See Letter from the Charg6 d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the
President of the Security Council, 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/15949 (1983), re-
printed in 22 I.L.M. 1112 (1983). Canada deplored the Soviet actions as "flagrant and
unacceptable violations of the norms and practices of international civil aviation and
international law." Id.
13. See Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of Australia to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/15948 (1983), reprinted
in 22 I.L.M. 1113 (1983). Australia deplored the Soviet action as being "incompatible
with civilized behavior between States." Id.
14. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the President of the
Security Council, 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/15948 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M.
1113 (1983).
15. 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2470 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1114
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of military force against an unarmed commercial airliner. 6 The Cana-
dian delegate stated:
The deliberate in-flight destruction of this civilian, unarmed,
easily identifiable passenger aircraft by sophisticated fighter
aircraft of the Soviet Union, no matter where it occurred, is
nothing short of murder. It is a flagrant attack on the safety of
international civil aviation which should never have occurred
and must not be allowed to occur again.' 7
The Australian delegate noted that "[t]here is no circumstance in
which any nation can be justified in shooting down an unarmed civilian
aircraft serving no military purpose. The fact that the aircraft may
have strayed into Soviet airspace provides no justification whatsoever
for an attack on the aircraft."'"
The Soviet Union was charged with violating the legal norms and
standards of international civil aviation regarding the use of force
against intruding civil aircraft,"9 the internationally recognized princi-
ples of proportionality 20 and elementary considerations of humanity.21
(1983).
16. Among the countries that deplored the Soviet action were the United States, the
Republic of Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, France, China, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, the United Kingdom, Zaire, Liberia, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Singapore, Colombia,
Fiji, Ecuador, Paraguay and the Federal Republic of Germany. For the text of the state-
ments to the Security Council, see id.
17. Id. at 1117.
18. Id. at 1118.
19. See supra notes 11-13; Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for
signature Dec. 7, 1944, annex 2, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1551, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (en-
tered into force April 4, 1947) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention], sets forth the
procedures to be used when intercepting a foreign aircraft not properly within the air-
space of the intercepting country. The recommended procedures include radio communi-
cations, rocking of wings and irregular flashing of lights. Attachment A to annex 2 pro-
vides that "interception should be limited to determining the identity of the aircraft and
providing any navigational guidance necessary for the safe conduct of the flight. Inter-
cepting aircraft should refrain from the use of weapons in all cases .. .of interception
of civil aircraft." Id. (emphasis added).
20. The Canadian delegate stated:
It is widely accepted, in international law that the principle of proportional-
ity applies. The action of the Soviet Union in dealing with this incident is with-
out doubt in total contravention of this principle. . . .It would be ludicrous for
the Soviet Union to pretend that it had to massacre 269 civilians, travelling on a
civilian aircraft, to protect its sovereignty. The opening of fire on the Korean
aircraft was in excess of what is commensurate with the gravity of the threat
represented by the presence of a civilian aircraft in Soviet air space and, there-
fore, the Soviet Union has infringed a basic principle of international law.
38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at , U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2470 (1983), reprinted in 22 I'L.M. 1117 (1983).
The delegate from Fiji contended:
21. Footnote 21 appears at p. 180.
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It was urged to offer a full and detailed account of the incident, to offer
an apology and complete compensation for the loss of the aircraft and
to the families of the victims, to adequately punish those responsible
and, finally, to give credible guarantees against the recurrence of such
violent actions against unarmed civil airplanes.22 A detailed investiga-
tion of the incident by the International Civil Aviations Organization
(ICAO) 23 was requested. 4
The Soviet Government expressed regret over the death of inno-
cent people, but asserted that "[t]he entire responsibility for this trag-
edy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of
America. ' '25 The United States was accused of intentionally sending
Flight 007 on a pre-planned intelligence-gathering mission over an area
of strategic importance to the Soviet Union.26
It would be incredible for the Soviet Union to suggest that in this incident,
in order to protect its sovereignty over its airspace, it was necessary to retaliate
in the manner in which it did.
The right of all States to enforce respect for the sovereignty of their air
space, like the enforcement of all rights and laws, is governed by the principle of
'proportionality' in international law. The Soviet action in shooting down the
civilian aircraft is clearly a violation of that basic principle of international law.
38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2472 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1113 (1983).
For a comprehensive discussion of the principle of proportionality, see M. McDoUGAL
AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 9, at 217-30.
21. The French delegate asserted that the Korean airliner was knowingly destroyed
"in disregard of elementary humanitarian considerations. . . recognized by the interna-
tional community." 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2470 (1983), reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 1119 (1983). The Belgian delegate accused the Soviet Union of committing "an
inhuman act, and a violation of the most elementary rules of conduct among civilized
nations, which no motives can justify without injecting an inadmissible element of cyni-
cism into international relations." Id. at 1129. The United States delegate asserted that
the general and well-recognized principles of humanity "would rule out shooting down a
passenger plane, a clearly marked airliner engaged in international civil aviation." Id. at
1115.
22. See Statements of the delegates from the Republic of Korea, Canada and the
United Kingdom, id. at 1114-19.
23. The ICAO was established under article 43 of the Chicago Convention, supra
note 19. Among the purposes of the ICAO are to insure the safe and orderly growth of
international civil aviation and to promote safety of flight in international air navigation.
Id. art. 44. The authority to conduct investigations relating to international civil aviation
is granted to the Council of the ICAO. Id. art. 55(e). The Council is authorized to
"[i]nvestigate, at the request of any contracting State, any situation which may appear to
present avoidable obstacles to the development of international air navigation; and, after
such investigation, issue such reports as may appear to be desirable." Id.
24. See Statements of the Japanese, Canadian, French and British delegates, 38 U.N.
SCOR ( ) at , U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2470 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1117-19 (1983).
25. 22 I.L.M. 1129 (1983) (statement of the Soviet Government read to the Security
Council by the Soviet delegate).
26. Id. The area over which the airliner flew is of strategic importance to the Soviet
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According to the Soviet Union, the airliner entered Soviet airspace
over the Kamchatka Peninsula at the same time "another spy plane of
the United States Air Force, an RC-135,"2 7 was in the same area. 28 So-
Union. To carry out military operations in time of war, the Soviet Pacific Fleet must
pass through the Le P6rouse Strait, a narrow waterway separating Sakhalin Island from
Japan. See Middleton, Area Where Russians Say Plane Intruded is Critical Part of
Their Far East Defenses, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at Al, col. 5. See also Pearson,
K.A.L. 007: What the U.S. Knew and When We Knew It, NATION, Aug. 18-25, 1984, at
105. The author, a doctoral candidate at Yale who is doing his dissertation on the De-
fense Department's Worldwide Military Command and Control System (Wimex), spent a
year investigating the details of the Flight 007 incident to try to authenticate a rumor
that the Wimex computers, which provide the National Command Authorities (as well as
the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) with timely infor-
mation and worldwide intelligence on a day-to-day basis, were not functioning at the
time Flight 007 was destroyed. Id.
He alleges, and the United States has not denied, that United States intelligence
agencies had detected preparations by the Soviet Union for a major test of its new SS-X-
25 intercontinental ballistic missile on the night of August 31, 1983 in the "highly sensi-
tive part of Kamchatka for which K.A.L. 007 was heading." Id. at 114. Mr. Pearson
contends that various United States military and intelligence agencies had to have
known that Flight 007 was off course prior to the attack over Sakhalin, that these agen-
cies knew that the airliner was heading toward Soviet territory while a major Soviet
missile test was underway and that these agencies had the time and means to communi-
cate with the airliner and correct its course, but did not do so. Id. at 105.
His conclusion is that
a conscious policy decision was made by the U.S. government-at what level it is
not clear-to risk the lives of 269 innocent people on the assumptions that an
extraordinary opportunity for gleaning intelligence information should not be
missed and that the Soviets would not dare shoot down a civilian airliner.
Id. at 106. The Reagan administration, the New York Times and the Washington Post
have denied the allegations contained in Mr. Pearson's article. See Taubman, Article on
Downing of Jet is Disputed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, at A3, col. 1. But see Wicker, A
Damning Silence, id., Sept. 7, 1984, at A27, col. 5, wherein the author severely criticizes
the United States press for ignoring Mr. Pearson's authoritative and excrutiatingly de-
tailed article, which "establish[ed] to a reasonable certainty that numerous agencies of
the U.S. Government knew or should have known, almost from the moment Flight 007
left Anchorage, Alaska, that the plane was off course and headed for intrusion into So-
viet air space, above some of the most sensitive Soviet military installations." Id. Mr.
Wicker concludes that "the deliberate silence-or the shocking failure-of so many U.S.
detection systems argue that President Reagan and the security establishment have
greater responsibility for the fate of Flight 007 than they admit-or that a complacent
press has been willing to seek." Id.
27. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 1 (reprint of statement in Tass). The
United States acknowledged that a RC-135 was flying in international airspace near
Kamchatka at the time, but asserted that the plane was on a routine mission, unaware of
the Korean airliner's presence and that the Soviet Union was well aware of these flights.
When the airliner was shot down at 1826 GMT over Sakhalin Island the RC-135 had
been on the ground at its Alaska base for more than an hour. 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at , U.N.
Doc. S/P.V. 2470 (1983). But see Pearson, supra note 26, at 112-13. One of the main
tasks of the RC-135, a sophisticated electronic surveillance aircraft, is to operate off the
28. Footnote 28 appears at p. 182.
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viet interceptors were sent aloft and signaled to the intruding aircraft
that it was flying in Soviet airspace, but the warnings were ignored. 9
The intruder was again intercepted by Soviet fighter planes as it ap-
proached Sakhalin Island and again attempts were made to establish
contact with it, including call signals on the international emergency
frequency of 121.5 megacycles.30 When the intruder did not respond to
these signals, a Soviet interceptor fired warning shots with tracer shells
along the route of the intruder plane."1 "Since even after this the in-
truder plane did not obey the demand to fly to a Soviet airfield and
tried to evade pursuit, the interceptor-fighter plane .. .fulfilled the
order of the command post to stop the flight."32
The Soviet Union contended that the interceptors could not know
that the intruder was a civilian aircraft because it was flying without
navigation lights in the dark of night in conditions of poor visibility
Kamchatka Penninsula to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements. Id. An-
other important mission of the RC-135 is to document the "electronic order of battle" of
Soviet defense forces by collecting and analyzing electronic signals. Id. This information
would allow United States bombers and missiles to more effectively evade Soviet air
defenses in the event of war. Id. at 113. Mr. Pearson suggests that one possible explana-
tion of the RC-135's presence in that area at that time was to "collect whatever intelli-
gence about Soviet defenses [the] K.A.L. 007's intrusion yielded." Id. He concludes that
whatever the reason for the presence of the RC-135 in the area of Kamchatka, "it must
have observed the Korean airliner and had ample time to take steps to correct its course,
but it did not do so." Id. at 115.
28. See 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2472 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M.
1127 (1983).
29. Id. However, neither the ICAO Council's subsequent investigation nor the tapes
played at the Security Council revealed any evidence that the airliner received any com-
munication from the Soviet interceptors. See infra notes 152, 153, 156 and accompanying
text.
30. 22 I.L.M. 1185 (1983). The Council of the ICAO has promulgated rules of the air
to be followed when interception of civil aircraft becomes necessary and it has urged the
contracting states to adhere strictly to these rules. The Chicago Convention provides
that the contracting states "undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft,
that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft." Chicago
Convention, supra note 19, art. 3(d). As interceptions of civil aircraft are, in all cases,
potentially hazardous, the Council has formulated special rules to be followed in this
type of situation. Section 5.1 of attachment A to the Rules of the Air provides: "When an
interception is being made, the intercept control unit and the intercepting aircrafts
should ... attempt to establish two-way communication with the intercepted aircraft in
a common language on the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz . 22 I.L.M. 1186
(1983).
31. See 22 I.L.M. 1128 (1983).
32. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1983, at A10, col. 4 (statement of Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in
Madrid).
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and it was not responding to the interceptors' signals and warnings.3,
The Air Defense command at Sakhalin Island concluded that the in-
truder was "a reconnaissance aircraft performing special tasks . . .,,s4
on the basis that: (1) the intruder flew over strategically important ar-
eas of the Soviet Union; (2) the intruder refused to obey repeated
warnings from the interceptors and (3) the Soviet ground control
picked up short coded radio signals of the type usually used in trans-
mitting intelligence information."s Thus, it was alleged that the in-
terceptors defended the sovereign airspace of the U.S.S.R. in conform-
ity both with Soviet border law s and international law.3
33. Marshall Ogarkov insisted that "the Soviet side took every responsible step to
force the plane to land on one of our Soviet airfields. However, the plane stubbornly
ignored all the warnings from the Soviet plane and did not want to answer radio con-
tact." Id., Sept. 10, 1983, at A4, col. 1.
34. Id. In June 1984, the British magazine Defense Attache published an unsigned
article contending that Flight 007 was intentionally sent over Soviet territory to "turn
on" the Soviet air defense system so that the ensuing electronic signals could be recorded
and monitored by the Space Shuttle, which was ideally situated in its orbit at the rele-
vant time to collect the data. See ECONOMIST, June 16, 1984, at 34. Defense Attache
subsequently paid a substantial sum of money to Korean Air Lines and issued a public
apology for suggesting in the article that "Korean Air Lines or any of its staff on the
aircraft" took part in a spy mission. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, at A5, col. 2. It is inter-
esting to note that the apology for the article did not say that there was no foundation
for suggesting that the United States or any of its agencies were involved in an intelli-
gence-gathering mission.
35. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1983, at A4, col. 1.
36. Article 36 of the State Border Law provides:
[t]he border guard and Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces shall, in effectuating
the protection of the USSR state boundary, use weapons and combat equipment
in order to repel . . . violators of the USSR state boundary . . . in the air...
when the cessation of the violation or detention of the offenders cannot be effec-
tuated by other means.
22 I.L.M. 1074 (1983). But see the statement of the British delegate who argued that,
since the airliner was about to leave Soviet airspace within a few minutes, its destruction
cannot be considered as a necessary measure for "stopping the violation when this could
not be effectuated by other means." 38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2476 (1983),
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1114 (1983).
The Swedish delegate stated:
[iut is a well known fact that the Soviet Union has severe rules of its own for
the protection of the State boundary, enabling Soviet units to use force even
against civilian aircraft. Such rules and instructions are not in accordance with
generally accepted norms of international law relevant to civilian transportation.
38 U.N. SCOR ( ) at, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2471 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1127 (1983).
Cf. Preamble to Soviet Border Law: "The protection of the state boundary of the USSR
shall be the most important integral part of defending the socialist Fatherland. The state
boundary of the USSR is inviolable. Any attempts to uiolate it slhal be resolutely sup-
pressed," U.S.S.R. BOUNDARY LAW, supra note 1, preamble (emphasis added), with article
2.1 of attachment A of annex 2: "Interception of civil aircraft should be avoided and
37. Footnote 37 appears at p. 184.
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I. SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The right to self-defense is reserved in article 51 of the Charter."
The relevant portion of article 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."39 The permissible scope of
this provision has been the subject of debate among legal scholars.40
One view holds that an armed attack is a condition precedent to the
lawful use of force in self-defense. 41 Other scholars argue that article 51
was meant only to be declaratory of the already existing customary law
of self-defense. 42
should be undertaken only as a last resort. If undertaken, the interception should be
limited to determining the identity of the aircraft and providing any navigational guid-
ance necessary for the safe conduct of the ffight. Intercepting aircraft should refrain
from the use of of weapons in all cases of interception of civil aircraft" 22 I.L.M. 1186
(1983) (emphasis added).
37. On March 6, 1984, the Council of the ICAO, by secret ballot, voted twenty to two,
with nine abstentions, to strongly deplore the destruction of Flight 007. See ICAO Coun-
cil Resolution of March 6, 1984, infra note 141. In response to the resolution Boris
Rygenkov, the Soviet delegate to the ICAO Council, insisted that the Soviet Union's
"measures to protect its airspace were in accord with the rules and procedures of inter-
national law. . . .Every warning measure was taken to have the violation handled and
the airplane landed." N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1984, at A12, cols. 3-4.
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
39. Id.
40. E.g., compare Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872 (1947), wherein the author argues
that the right of self-defense under article 51 "does not exist against any form of aggres-
sion which does not constitute 'armed attack'. . . . The 'threat of aggression' does not
justify self-defense under Article 51 . . . .The 'imminent' armed attack does not suffice
under Article 51." Id. at 878, with M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 9, at 237
n.261, wherein Professor McDougal maintains:
Professor Kunz . . .[is] in effect purporting to discover in Article 51 words
not written there in printer's ink. [He] interpret[s] the phrase 'if an armed at-
tack occurs' as if it read 'if, and only if,' an armed attack occurs. A proposition
that 'if A, then B' is not equivalent to, and does not necessarily imply, the pro-
position that 'if, and only if A, then B.' Id. (emphasis in original).
41. See, e.g., Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 219,
266 (1962); Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947).
42. See, e.g., S. MALAWER, Anticipatory Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter in STUDIES IN INT'L L. 191, 197-98 (2d ed. 1977).
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A. The Strict View of Article 51
Proponents of the strict interpretation of self-defense read article
51 in connection with article 2, paragraph 3, which instructs members
to settle their disputes by peaceful means without endangering inter-
national peace, 43 and article 2, paragraph 4, which outlaws the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state," in order to assert that the use of force in self-defense is
lawful if, but only if "an armed attack occurs. '45 This view narrows the
traditional conception of self-defense which permits defensive action
even before an armed attack occurs if there is an instant and over-
whelming necessity.4 6 The strict constructionists argue that article 51
was intended to limit the traditional right of self-defense to actual
armed attack.4 7 Professor Jessup wrote:
43. Article 2, paragraph 3 states: "All Members shall settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
44. Article 2, paragraph 4 states: "All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations." Id. art. 2, para. 4.
45. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN PoLIcY 232-33 (1968). Pro-
fessor Henkin argues:
The fair reading of Article 51 permits unilateral use of force only in very
narrow and clear circumstances, in self-defense if an armed attack occurs. Noth-
ing in the history of its drafting . . . suggests&that the framers of the Charter
intended something broader than the language implied. [N]either the failure of
the Security Council ... nor the development of terrible weapons, suggests that
the Charter should now be read to authorize unilateral force when an armed
attack has not occurred.
Id. See also Brownlie, supra note 41, at 219. After an extensive discussion of the subject
the author concludes that "the beginning of an armed attack is a condition precedent for
resort to force in self-defense." Id. at 266.
46. See Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938).
47. See Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 560 (1963). Professor
Wright, an adherent to the narrow view of self-defense, argued that the United States
quarantine of Cuba in October 1962 to prevent the delivery of nuclear missiles into Cuba
from the Soviet Union was an unlawful exercise of the right of self-defense because, inter
alia:
the United States has [not] lived up to its legal obligations . .. to submit
threats to the peace to the United Nations before taking unilateral action, and
to refrain from [the] use or threat of force ... except ... against armed attack,
under authority of the United Nations, or with the consent of the state against
which the force is used.
Id. at 563. But see McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM.
J. INT'L L. 597 (1963) and Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FoREIGN Avy. 550
(1963) (both authors present the argument that the United States acted in conformity
with the Charter during the crisis).
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This restriction in Article 51 very definitely narrows the free-
dom of action which states had under international law. A case
could be made out for self-defense in the traditional law where
the injury was threatened but no attack had yet taken place.
Under the Charter, alarming military preparations by a neigh-
boring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but
would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which
believed itself threatened.49
Resort to the use of force in self-defense was narrowly limited to
an armed attack as a precondition because the Charter was interpreted
as providing a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Arti-
cle 33 requires the parties to a dispute to seek a solution by "peaceful
means."4 9 Failing that, the parties are obliged to refer the dispute to
the Security Council, which may take such action as it deems neces-
sary.50 The threat or use of force under any circumstances short of an
armed attack, therefore, is unlawful.
Under the restrictive view of article 51, the quarantine imposed by
the United States in October 1962, upon the importation of nuclear
missiles into Cuba from the Soviet Union, was not a lawful exercise by
the United States of the threat to use force in self-defense. 1 Professor
48. P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948). See also Badr, The Exculpa-
tory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA. J. INr'L & Comp. L. 1, 16
(1980). The author argues that the right of self-defense under the Charter is only permis-
sible in response to an armed attack. "[O]nly the most violent and massive forms of
armed aggression qualify as armed attack and justify the use of force in self-defense
under Article 51." Id.
49. Article 33, paragraph 1 reads: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall
... seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation ...or other peaceful means of
their own choice." U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 37. Article 37 reads:
1. Should the parties to a dispute . . . fail to settle it by the means indicated
[in article 33], they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it
shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such
terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Id.
51. See Wright, supra note 47. On October 23, 1962, President Kennedy ordered the
Secretary of Defense to take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of the nuclear
missiles to Cuba, "employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in coopera-
tion with any forces that may be made available by other American States." The United
States argued that the introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba by the Soviet Union
constituted an unlawful threat to the security of the United States and that the response
of the United States met the customary international law prerequisites of self-defensive
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Quincy Wright, a strict constructionist of article 51, maintained that
the nuclear missiles were requested by the Castro government for de-
fensive purposes and under recognized principles of international law,
"a sovereign state is free to take, within its territory, measures which it
deems necessary for its defense . . . . and other states are free to assist
it in such defense. '52 He argued that the quarantine imposed by the
United States was a unilateral intervention in the domestic affairs of
Cuba and the threat to use military force to prevent the missile deliv-
ery was a breach of the United States obligations under the Charter.5"
Such a restrictive interpretation of article 51 is unrealistic and
must be rejected for three reasons. First, the fundamental predicate for
the restrictive right of self-defense-a reasonably operational Security
Council-has never come to pass." Article 51 of the Charter envisions
a Security Council with the effective authority to resolve international
disputes, thereby precluding resort to force. But the Security Council
has proven itself ineffective due to the political biases of its members. s5
action, i.e., necessity and proportionality. See Note, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the
U.N. Charter: An Analysis of the United States Position, 16 STAN. L. REv. 160 (1963); 4
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 523-24 (1965); McDougal, supra note 47;
Chayes, supra note 47.
52. Wright, supra note 47, at 550.
53. Id. at 564. But see McDougal, supra note 47. Professor McDougal argued that the
threat against which the United States reacted came from the Soviet Union, not Cuba.
The missiles, had they been installed, would have been directly pointed at all the states
within the region, an area of undoubted strategic concern to the United States. Their
deployment would have caused a serious disruption in the whole world balance of power
between the totalitarian and non-totalitarian states. Id. at 601. Since the employment of
force by the United States was clearly limited in intensity and magnitude to that neces-
sary to remove the provoking threat, he concluded that "the action taken by the United
States was in accord with traditional general community expectations about the require-
ments of self-defense." Id. at 603.
54. See Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87
RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 338 (1955):
The reduction of self-defense to an interim right was made on the assump-
tion that the international quasi-order, which was to be established by the
United Nations, would normally work. The Security Council was to exercise the
utmost freedom in determining what amounted to a threat to peace, breach of
peace or act of aggression, including armed attack. If, therefore, the Security
Council fails to fulfill its appointed function, this task falls back on the individ-
ual members of the United Nations.
Id. See also Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern Int'l Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 1, 20 (1982).
55. See Vallat, The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 155 (1965). The author states:
Whether recourse to the Security Council or the General Assembly is advis-
able in a particular case depends on a number of general considerations ....
First and foremost is the consideration that both the Security Council and the
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Secondly, there is no indication that the drafters of the Charter
intended so narrow an interpretation of article 51. Professor McDougal
stated:
There is not the slightest evidence that the framers of the
United Nations Charter, by inserting one provision which ex-
pressly reserves a right of self-defense, had the intent of impos-
ing by this provision new limitations upon the traditional right
of states. In fact, Professor Bowett summarizes, the prepara-
tory work suggests "only that the article should safeguard the
right of self-defense, not restrict it." Thus, Committee 1/I
stressed in its report, approved by both Commission I and the
Plenary Conference, that "the use of arms in legitimate self-
defense remains admitted and unimpaired.""8
The third reason for rejecting the literal interpretation of article
51 is that it is unrealistic in the modern world to require a state to
submit to an armed attack before that state may lawfully take defen-
sive measures to protect itself.57 As Professor Rostow succinctly ob-
General Assembly are political organs and will be influenced, if not actually
guided, by political motives. Members are likely to be influenced as much, or
more, by group loyalties, their general international policies and their own spe-
cial interests as by the merits of the case .... [I]n all cases there is a strong
tendency for Members of the United Nations to put political factors first and to
subordinate the interests of justice and international law to these factors.
Id. at 159-60. See also J. SPANIER, GAmas NATIONS PLAY 243 (2d ed. 1975). Professor
Spanier argues that the United Nations "only registers the power politics of the state
system," and its decisions "are not made according to some impartial, nonpolitical, and
therefore purportedly morally superior standard of justice." Id. Professor McDougal ar-
gues that "to wait for organs of the world community to determine the necessity of act-
ing [in self-defense] is a utopian concept." M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 9,
at 219.
56. McDougal, supra note 47, at 599. On July 13, 1945, in the course of the hearings
on the Charter before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Foster Dulles,
one of the official advisers to the United States delegation at San Francisco, stated:
there is nothing whatever in the Charter which impairs a nation's right of self-
defense .... At San Francisco, one of the things which we stood for most
stoutly, and which we achieved with the greatest difficulty, was a recognition of
the fact that the doctrine of self-defense ... could stand unimpaired and could
function without the approval of the Security Council.
12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-85 (1965).
57. Professors McDougal and Feliciano observe that a denial of:
a right of self-defense in any and all contexts not exhibiting overt violence and
even against the most intense uses of non-military instruments-may, under the
same conditions of the present world, amount to requiring a target state to be
the sedentary fowl in an international turkey-shoot.
McDougal & Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggres-
sion and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J. 1057, 1120-21 n.182 (1959).
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served, "[i]nternational law, after all, is not a suicide pact.""8 No ra-
tional person could suggest that the United States, or any nation, must
first wait for nuclear missiles to be detonated on its territory before it
may lawfully respond with defensive measures employing force. When
coercion against a state consists of military measures just short of an
armed attack the coerced state should, and must, be entitled to protect
itself.8 9
It is submitted, therefore, that article 51 is only a declaratory arti-
cle intended to preserve the customary right of self-defense and was
not intended to render that right effectively null and void.'
B. Self-Defense Under Customary International Law
Discussion of the right to use force in self-defense under custom-
ary international law must begin with the classic formulation offered
by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in a letter to Great Britain's
58. Rostow, Law 'Is Not a Suicide Pact', N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1983, at A24, col. 1.
Professor Rostow argued that the United States, by its threat to use force to prevent the
Soviet missiles from reaching Cuba in 1962, "applied an established principle of the in-
ternational law of self-defense. The target of an illegal use of force need not wait before
defending itself until it is too late to do so. International law, after all, is not a suicide
pact." Id.
59. See MacChesny, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L
L. 592, 595 (1963), wherein the author states:
Nothing in the history of Article 51 requires a construction limiting self-
defense to a response to an armed attack. Realism, common sense, and the de-
structive nature of modern weapons demand the retention of this customary
right under adequate safeguards until the community system makes its use no
longer necessary.
Id. See Feinstein, Self-Defence and Israel in International Law: A Reappraisal, 11
ISRAEL L. REV. 516, 530 (1976). The author argued:
tJhe political necessities of contemporary international life demand a broad
scope for self-defence. To confine such a right to armed attack alone, in a system
clearly lacking effectual methods of collective security, could quite possibly re-
sult in restricting the lawful right of a state to secure itself against extermina-
tion. To wait for an actual attack, the state could be so stunned by it that it
might be no longer able to offer resistance.
Id.
60. It necessarily follows from an application of the restrictive interpretation of arti-
cle 51 that the destruction of Flight 007 was an unlawful use of force by the Soviet
Union. Assuming arguendo that the airliner was intentionally sent over Soviet territory
for intelligence-gathering purposes, the requirement of an armed attack as a condition
precedent to the lawful employment of force was not met. Since the Soviet Union has
repeatedly insisted that the destruction of Flight 007 was a lawful response to the aerial
trespass, "which was deliberately staged to foment anti-Soviet psychosis and promote
militarist programs," Schmemann, Souiet is Pressing Case on K.A.L. 007, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 1984, at A3, col. 1, its justification must be premised on the customary interna-
tional law doctrine regarding the use of force in self-defense.
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Lord Ashburton during the Caroline dispute."' During the Canadian
Rebellion of 1831, a group of insurgents seized arms and guns from a
United States arsenal. Preparations were made to cross from the
United States island of Niagara into British-held territory on the
steamer Caroline. To prevent the crossing, an English force boarded
the steamer within United States waters. The Caroline was set afire
and adrift down Niagara Falls."' The British Government invoked the
right of self-defense to justify the action taken by the English
soldiers.6 Secretary Webster, in turn, demanded that the British Gov-
ernment show the existence of a:
• . . necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for
it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even sup-
posing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter
the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unrea-
sonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
clearly within it."
Although the legality of the act was factually disputed, both parties
were in agreement as to the applicable legal principle stated by Secre-
tary Webster. 5 The recognition and acceptance of Webster's formula-
tion on the right to use force in self-defense-based on instant, over-
whelming necessity66-makes it all the more valuable as a precedent. 7
Customary international law provides that the employment of
force in self-defense is subject to two limitations which may be de-
scribed as necessity and proportionality." Initially, there must exist an
61. See Jennings, supra note 46.
62. Id. at 82-84.
63. Id. at 85.
64. Id. at 89.
65. Lord Ashburton stated: "Agreeing, therefore, on the general principle and on the
possible exception to which it is liable, the only question between us is, whether this
occurrence came within the limits fairly to be assigned to such exceptions . Id. at
92 n.36.
66. Id. at 89.
67. Id. at 92.
68. See McDougal, supra note 47, at 597-98:
In broadest formulation, this right of self-defense, as established by tradi-
tional practice, authorizes a state which, being a target of activities by another
state, reasonably decides, as third-party observers may determine reasonable-
ness, that such activities imminently require it to employ the military instru-
ment to protect its territorial integrity and political independence, to use such
force as may be necessary and proportionate for securing its defense. In a still
primatively organized world in which expectations are low about the effective
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actual or threatened infringement of the rights of the defending state
and a failure on the part of the infringing state to stop or prevent the
infringement." Under these conditions a state may lawfully resort to
acts of self-defense which are strictly confined to the object of stopping
or preventing the infringement and reasonably proportionate to what is
required for achieving this object.7 0 These are the general formulations
governing community expectations concerning self-defense and, as
such, raise questions as to their applicability in a particular situation:
Who initially determines that a situation of necessity exists which re-
quires the offended state to resort to the use of force to protect its
essential rights? Who determines whether the degree of force employed
in a particular situation was proportionate to the threat imposed
against the offended state?
In the absence of an effective community organization capable of
protecting individual members, the offended state itself must initially
determine whether a threat of sufficient magnitude exists requiring it
to employ the military instrument.7" "To wait for authority to act from
any outside body," Professor Brierly observed, "may mean disaster.
'7 2
The initial determination made by a state to employ force in self-
defense must, however, be subject to a subsequent appraisal by third-
party decisionmakers, whose aim is to further the common interest in
maintaining at least a minimum level of world order:
73
capability of the general community to protect its individual members, this right
has been regarded as indispensible to the maintenance of even the most modest
minimum order.
Id. See also M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 9, at 217: "The principle require-
ments which the 'customary law' of self-defense makes prerequisite to the lawful asser-
tion of [self-defense] are commonly summarized in terms of necessity and proportional-
ity." Id.
69. See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Inter-
national Law, 81:2 RECUEIL DES CouRs 455, 463-64 (1952).
70. Id. Professor Bowett offers a similar characterization of the right of self-defense:
1. The right of self-defense lies against conduct by states which is delictual
as being in breach of a duty established by international law.
2. The exercise of the right of self-defense presupposes the absence of any
alternative means of protection for certain essential rights of the state
which are endangered.
3. The danger to those rights must be serious, and must be actual or
imminent.
4. The measures of self-defense taken must be reasonable, limited to the
necessity of protection, and proportionate to the danger.
D. Bowgrr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1958). See also McDougal & Feli-
ciano, supra note 57.
71. See M. McDouoA & F. FELICIANO, supra note 9, at 218.
72. J. BRIERLY, supra note 9, at 320.
73. See M. McDOuGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 9, at 219: "[It has... been gener-
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The practice of states decisively rejects the view that a state
need only declare its own action to be defensive for that action
to be defensive as a matter of law . . . . It is clear that the
defensive or non-defensive character of any state's action is
universally regarded as a question capable of determination by
an objective examination of the relevant facts.74
The world community honors the right of a state to use force in self-
defense, other than in response to an armed attack, with fundamental
limitations. Actions taken by a state for the purpose of self-defense are
subject to examination by third-party decisionmakers to determine the
degree to which those actions conform to community expectations. An
examination of prior incidents involving the use of force against civil
aerial intruders is necessary in order to determine community expecta-
tions concerning self-defense and the treatment of intruding civil air-
liners as evidenced by states' practice and opinion.
II. PRIOR AERIAL INCIDENTS
On June 27, 1955, Bulgarian interceptors shot down an Israeli (El
Al) commercial airliner, on a flight from London to Tel Aviv, over the
Greco-Bulgarian border.7 All fifty-one passengers and seven crew
members died and the aircraft was destroyed.76
The following day, the Bulgarian Government issued a communi-
qu6 stating that anti-aircraft defenses, which had been unable to iden-
tify the aircraft, opened fire on the airliner after it entered Bulgarian
airspace without warning.7
ally agreed that both this first provisional decision by a claimant target state and the
measures it actually takes are subject to review for their necessity and proportionality by
the general community of states." Id.
74. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 9, at 320-21. In the post-World War II war crimes
trials at Tokyo (as at Nuremberg), the defense argued, inter alia, that a nation resorting
to measures in self-defense was to be the sole judge of the matter and that the question
could not be submitted to any tribunal. The Tribunal rejected this argument, saying that
"the right of self-defense does not confer upon the State resorting to war the authority to
make a final determination upon the justification for its action." 0. TAKAYANAGI, THE
TOKYO TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-37 (1948).
75. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1955, at 1, col. 7.
76. Id., July 29, 1955, at 1, col. 1. The passengers included British, Canadian, South
African, United States, French and Swiss nationals. See Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by
Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45 J. AIR L. 595, 603 (1980).
77. Israeli Airliner Shot Down by Bulgarian Fighters-Loss of 58 Lives- Bulgarian
Apology and Offer of Compensation, 10 KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 14359E
(Aug. 6-13, 1955) (hereinafter cited as KEZsINGS). It is significant to note that the com-
muniqu6 of July 28th deliberately misstates the manner in which the airliner was de-
stroyed. As later revealed, Bulgarian interceptors, which were clearly in a position to
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The Israeli Government strongly protested the attack, calling the
act of the interceptors "a wanton disregard for human life and for ele-
mentary obligations of humanity."' The world community joined
Israel in denouncing the attack.79 The French Government described
the Bulgarian action as "an act of war.""0 Israel demanded that those
responsible for the attack be punished and that full compensation be
paid for the loss of the aircraft and to the families of the victims.8 1
Bulgaria was requested to give assurances against the recurrence of
this type of response in the future.8 2
The United States, the United Kingdom and Israel submitted ap-
plications to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) instituting pro-
ceedings on the El Al incident against Bulgaria." The legal positions
taken by these states in their memorials are relevant as a source of
opinio juris on the use of force against civil aerial intruders.
All three memorials relied strongly on the principles enunciated by
the I.C.J. in the Corfu Channel case.84 That judgment was cited as evi-
dence that international law condemns peacetime actions by states
that unnecessarily or recklessly risk the lives or property of nationals
of other states.85
The British and American memorials also cited the case of Garcia
identify the airplane, were responsible for the downing. See Hughes, supra note 76, at
603.
78. See Hughes, supra note 76, at 603.
79. See id. The Protest Note of the British states: "H.M. Government cannot accept
that any Government is in its right in shooting down a civil aircraft in time of peace." Id.
at 604. The United States declared that "the brutal attack" on the Israeli airliner was a
"grave violation of all principles of international law." Id. Israel, France and Sweden also
sent Protest Notes. Id.
80. Id. at 610.
81. Id. The United States, British, French, and Swedish Notes also called for the
same response by Bulgaria. Id.
82. Id. at 605.
83. See Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. Pleadings (Aerial
Incident of July, 1955) 22-24; Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Bulg.), 1959
I.C.J. Pleadings (Aerial Incident of July, 1955) 34-37; Memorial of Israel (Isr. v. Bulg.),
1959 I.C.J. Pleadings (Aerial Incident of July, 1955) 5-7.
84. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Merits Judgment of Apr. 9). In Corfu
Channel, British warships proceeding through the Channel were heavily damaged by
mines laid in Albanian territorial waters. Even though there was no evidence indicating
that Albania had laid the mines, the Court held Albania responsible for the damage
caused for having failed to give notice of the minefield in its territorial waters. By virtue
of its supervision of the Channel, Albania had knowledge of the minefield. The duty
which Albania had to warn ships of the presence of the minefield was based "on certain
general and well-recognized principles," including "elementary considerations of human-
ity, even more exacting in peace than in war." Id. at 22.
85. See Memorial of the United States, supra note 83, at 214.
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v. United States,8 6 decided by the United States-Mexican General
Claims Commission in 1927. The Garcia case involved a United States
officer who opened fire on a raft which was crossing in an unauthorized
area from the United States to the Mexican side of the border. The
raft carried several members of a Mexican family; a small child was
killed by the shots.8 7 The Commission held that the officer's act was
illegal under international law and laid down four requirements to be
met before the shooting of unarmed civilians may be justified:
(a) the act of firing . . . should not be indulged in unless the
delinquency is sufficiently well-stated;
(b) it should not be indulged in unless the importance of
preventing . . . the delinquency by firing is in reasonable
proportion to the danger arising from it;
(c) it should not be indulged in whenever other practicable
ways of preventing or repressing the delinquency might be
available;
(d) it should be done with sufficient precaution not to create
unnecessary danger .... as
Garcia was cited as additional support for the proposition that certain
elementary considerations of humanity exist and are of a legal nature.8 9
The United Kingdom categorically rejected the right to use force
against civil airliners:
The Government of the United Kingdom submits that there
can be no justification in international law for the destruction,
by a State using armed force, of a foreign civil aircraft, clearly
identifiable as such, which is on a scheduled passenger flight,
even if that aircraft enters, without previous authorization, the
airspace of the territory of that State.90
It also submitted that the use of armed force against a civil air-
liner could not be justified as a legitimate exercise of self-defense
under article 51 of the Charter, even if the airliner enters another
state's airspace without warning.91 The British position regarding a
proper remedy was that the offended state should proceed through
diplomatic channels with the state whose nationality the aircraft
86. Garcia Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119 (1928).
87. Id. at 121-24.
88. Id. at 123.
89. See Hughes, supra note 76, at 606.
90. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 83, at 358.
91. Id.
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bears.92
The general position taken by the United States was that, regard-
less of the explanation for the aircraft's entering Bulgarian airspace, no
pilot of a civil airliner would expect to be shot down without being
given a safe alternative, and without the opportunity to keep himself,
his passengers and his crew from being killed. "3
The United States argued that the issue of the legality of the use
of force in this situation could not even arise unless the offended state
raised an articulable security necessity, which Bulgaria did not claim:
"To have any semblance of international legal validity such evidence
would be essential. '94 Firing on the airliner was unnecessary, the
United States maintained, because the Bulgarian interceptors had an
opportunity to identify it and report to the ground authorities. Clearly,
governments owe a duty of safety to overflying passengers and crew
and a duty not to kill, destroy or tolerate destruction and pilferage.9
The Israeli position was similar in spirit. Israel argued "that in
normal times there can be no legal justification for haste and inade-
quate measures after interception of, and for the opening of fire on, a
foreign civil aircraft, clearly marked as such."9 Once Bulgaria decided
to use force against the airliner, it was subject to the duty to take into
consideration the elementary obligations of humanity, and not to use a
degree of force in excess of what is commensurate with the reality and
the gravity of the threat (if any).97
Israel maintained that there are two proper remedies available to
the offended state.99 The first remedy is to require the intruding air-
liner to return to its authorized position. Israel stressed that all actions
and instructions must not cause an undue degree of physical danger to
the aircraft and its occupants. 9 The second remedy is for the offended
state to take the matter up through the appropriate diplomatic
channels. 'o
Unfortunately, the I.C.J. never reached the merits of the various
arguments as to the legality of the use of force against intruding civil
airliners under international law. The cases were removed from the
92. Id. at 363.
93. Memorial of the United States, supra note 83, at 210.
94. Id. at 242.
95. Id. at 239.
96. Memorial of Israel, supra note 83, at 89.
97. Id. at 79.
98. Id. at 87.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Court's list for lack of jurisdiction over Bulgaria. 10 ' But the Bulgarian
Government did assume responsibility for the tragedy. On August 3,
1955, the Bulgarian Government issued a statement based upon the
findings of a Ministerial Commission of inquiry."' Bulgaria admitted
that the air defenses had "shown hastiness ' ' 03 and had failed to take
all necessary measures to force the aircraft to change direction. It
promised to "discover and punish those responsible for the catastro-
phe," 0 to take "all measures to prevent a repetition of such inci-
dents,"'0 5 and to pay compensation to the families of the fifty-eight
victims. 106
The most serious incident measured in terms of loss of life prior to
the Flight 007 tragedy occurred on February 21, 1973.107 A Libyan air-
liner on a flight from Tripoli to Cairo overflew Cairo and intruded
twelve miles into Israeli-occupied Sinai.' Israeli interceptors shot the
airliner down and the 108 persons aboard died. 0 9
Cairo Radio described the incident as a "monstrous and savage
crime which is . . .not only a violation of international law but of all
human values . . . it is premeditated murder of unarmed civilians in-
cluding women and children."' 0O
Israel argued that the Libyan airliner violated airspace over occu-
101. See generally Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the Connally Amendment, 56 Am. J.
INT'L L. 357 (1962).
102. KEESINGS, supra note 77, at 14359E.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Hughes, supra note 76, at 604-05. An earlier incident reveals a pattern of
response similar to that taken by Bulgaria-initial reluctance to assume responsibility
with a subsequent promise to pay compensation. On July 23, 1954, a Cathay Pacific com-
mercial airliner on a flight from Bangkok to Hong Kong strayed into China's airspace
and was shot down by Chinese interceptors. The crippled airliner ditched into heavy seas
and a number of passengers drowned. The captain of the aircraft stated that the in-
terceptors attacked without the slightest warning. Id. at 601-02. The reaction from the
West was one of uniform condemnation and outrage. Both the United States and the
United Kingdom demanded that the Chinese Government pay compensation for the
damage caused by the attack. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1954, at 3, col. 1. China initially
remained silent concerning its responsibility for the attack, but subsequently agreed "to
consider appropriate compensation for the loss of life and damage to property." Id., July
27, 1954, at 6, col. 1. The Chinese Government asserted that the airliner had been fired
on by accident as it was mistaken for a Koumintang aircraft on a mission of aggression.
Id. See also Hughes, supra note 76, at 602.
107. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1973, at Al, cols. 5-6.
108. Id.
109. The airliner burst into flames and disintegrated during an attempt to crash-land
in the Sinai desert. Id. at A6, col. 1.
110. Id. at A4, col. 6.
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pied Sinai, a very sensitive area of Israeli territory."' It further alleged
that the pilot of the airliner refused to heed repeated warnings which
were conveyed in accordance with international procedures" 2 and that
the interceptors intended only to damage the airliner to force it to
land, not to destroy it." s Shimon Peres, Israel's Minister of Transport
at that time, stated that "Israel acted in accordance with international
law, defended its airspace and did what was required after serious
consideration."14
Mr. Ahmed Nouh, Egyptian Civil Aviation Minister, denounced
the interceptors' action and produced tapes of the Libyan airliner's
conversations with Egyptian air traffic controllers, which tended to
confirm allegations that the Israeli interceptors attacked without warn-
ing." 5 Since Egyptian controllers were monitoring the same radio fre-
quency as the airliner, it was argued that any radio warning given by
the interceptors would have been picked up and recorded in Cairo. The
tapes also revealed that the pilot realized he had lost direction and was
communicating with Egyptian ground control just before the shots
were fired."'
111. The Israeli Cabinet issued a communiqu6 which stated that the airliner flew
over Israeli military concentrations along the Suez Canal and over a military airfield in
the Sinai, "a most highly sensitive and controlled military area." Id., Feb. 22, 1973, at
A4, cols. 1-2.
112. The late Prime Minister Golda Meir expressed regret that the Libyan airliner
did not "respond to repeated warnings that were given in accordance with international
procedure." Id., Feb. 23, 1973, at Al, col. 6. Then Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
described the incident as a tragedy but asserted that the crew of the airliner must bear
the responsibility because they "ignored repeated instructions to land." Id. The Israeli
Cabinet stated that the jetliner was intercepted as a "last resort" after its pilot acknowl-
edged warnings but ignored them. See supra note 111.
113. See Hughes, supra note 76, at 612. A similar claim was made by the Soviet
Union when its interceptors shot down an Air France plane which allegedly intruded into
Soviet airspace over East Berlin on April 29, 1952. The Soviet Union maintained that the
airliner violated Soviet air regulations and refused to obey the orders of the intereptors
to land. Furthermore, it asserted that the shots fired by the single interceptor were in-
tended as a warning to the Air France plane to land and were not meant to down the
intruder. Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and Interna-
tional Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 559, 574 (1953). The Allied High Commissioners in Ger-
many issued a joint protest in which they stated that, regardless of the interceptors'
intent, "to fire, in any circumstances, even by way of warning, on an unarmed aircraft in
time of peace, wherever that aircraft may be, is entirely inadmissible, and contrary to all
standards of civilized behavior." Id.
114. Hughes, supra note 76, at 611-12.
115. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1973, at Al, col. 6.
116. The airliner had lost its way due to instrument failure and the crew believed
they were over Egyptian territory and were being followed by Egyptian MIGs. Id. at A4,
col. 1.
19841
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Israel subsequently agreed to pay compensation to the families of
the victims "in deference to humanitarian considerations""' 7 and
agreed to cooperate with an international investigation of the inci-
dent," '8 but continued to maintain that the Israeli Air Force acted "in
strict conformity with international law."" Israel's Defense Minister
at the time, Moshe Dayan, argued that Israel may have made "an error
of judgment . . . but that does not put us on the guilty side.'12 0 The
investigation conducted by the ICAO Council, however, concluded oth-
erwise.1 2 ' On June 4, 1973, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution
which found "no justification for the shooting down of the Libyan civil
aircraft"' 2 2 and "strongly condemn[ed]' 121 Israel's action as "a flagrant
violation of the principles enshrined in the Chicago Convention . . .
and a serious danger against the safety of international civil
aviation."""
The most recent incident prior to the Flight 007 incident also in-
volved the Soviet Union and an off-course South Korean airliner. On
April 20, 1978, a KAL Boeing 707 on a polar flight from Paris to Seoul
made a forced landing on a frozen lake deep in Soviet territory after
being fired at by Soviet interceptors.2 5 Two of the 113 passengers were
killed and eleven others were injured. 2 When it was intercepted, the
airliner was flying ninety degrees off course in a Soviet high security
zone closed to foreigners."2 7
117. Id.. Feb. 26, 1973, at Al, col. 4 (statement issued by the Israeli Government).
118. Then Israeli Defense Minister Dayan stated that Israel was willing to cooperate
with any international organization and to give "the fullest possible accounting of the
incident." Id., Feb. 25, 1973, at Al, col. 1.
119. Id., Feb. 26, 1973, at Al, col. 4.
120. Id., Feb. 25, 1973, at Al, col. 1.
121. On March 5, 1973, the Council of the ICAO instituted a fact finding technical
investigation into the destruction of the Libyan airliner. See Hughes, supra note 76, at
612.
122. ICAO Council Resolution of June 4, 1973, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1180 (1973).
123. Id.
124. Id. The Egyptian Government denounced the attack on the airliner as "an act of
mass murder violating all international laws and human considerations." N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1973, at A12, col. 5. At an extraordinary session of the ICAO Council on Feb. 28,
1973, the Soviet delegate denounced Israel's action as "a criminal act of international
terrorism" and called on the Council "to strongly condemn this criminal act." 22 I.L.M.
1130 (1983).
125. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1978, at Al, col. 3. See Hughes, supra note 76, at 613.
126. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1978, at Al, col. 3.
127. Id. The Korean airliner landed near the town of Kern, 390 miles northeast of
Leningrad. The Soviet newspaper Tass stated that the incident resulted from the failure
of the crew to abide by international flight rules and their failure to obey the demands of
the Soviet Defense Forces. The Tass statement also alleged that Soviet authorities
feared the airliner was on an intelligence mission. Id., Apr. 27, 1978, at A15, cols. 5-6
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The Soviet Union alleged that the pilot of the airliner "refused to
obey the demands of Soviet fighter planes of the air defence to follow
them in order to land at an airfield." 2" The pilot and navigator of the
airliner, while in the Soviet Union before being released, pleaded guilty
to violating Soviet airspace and the international rules of flying, and
confirmed that they had understood the orders of the Soviet in-
terceptors but had not obeyed them. 2 '
The Soviet Union was not publicly condemned by the world com-
munity for its action. In fact, South Korean President Park Chung Hee
expressed his gratitude to the Soviet Union for the speedy return of
the passengers.130 On May 1, 1978, South Korean Foreign Minister
Park Tong Jin thanked the Soviet Union for the release of the air-
liner's pilot and navigator.'31
Prior incidents involving the use of force against civil aerial in-
truders and the limitations on the right to use force in self-defense
under customary international law indicate that certain standards of
treatment are required of an offended state before force may lawfully
be employed against an intruding civil airliner. 3 2
(reprint of the Tass statement).
128. Id., Apr. 30, 1978, at A15, col. 1. See Hughes, supra note 76, at 615.
129. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1978, at Al, col. 5. But see Lohr, Pilot in the '78 Incident
Recalls His Experience, id., Sept. 9, 1983, at All, cols. 5-6. Kim Chang Kyu, the pilot of
the Korean airliner shot down in the 1978 incident, stated that "[aifter I was shot down,
the Russians made the same claims we're hearing now .... They said, 'We tracked you
for more than two hours, flew around the plane, fired tracers in front of you'-all that. It
all sounds exactly the same." Id. In speaking of his own encounter with the Soviet in-
terceptors he stated that he saw a Russian interceptor only once, behind and to the right
of him. He then slowed his speed and flashed the landing lights in accordance with inter-
national standards. He also attempted to establish radio contact with the interceptor but
asserted that "Soviet fighter pilots have only one channel, from air to ground." Id.
130. Id., Apr. 24, 1978, at A10, col. 4.
131. Hughes, supra note 76, at 614.
132. Id. at 620. The author maintains that
[t]he use of force against intruding civil airliners is narrow, limited by inter-
national customary law. Firing on such an aircraft can be considered lawful only
if...
1. It is necessary to effect a landing for the security of the offended territorial
state;
2. The importance of discontinuing the intrusion by firing upon the aircraft is
in reasonable proportion to the danger to the territorial state arising from it;
and, most importantly,
3. All other practicable means of discontinuing the intrusion have been ex-
hausted-the aircraft has refused to comply with clear and appropriate in-
structions to return to authorized airspace or follow interceptors to a desig-
nated airfield adequate for the type of aircraft involved.
Id. If any of the above criteria are not satisfied, the offending territorial state cannot
lawfully bring down the intruder with armed force. Id.
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First, an offended state does not have an unqualified right to use
force against an intruding airliner. In none of the prior incidents did
the offended state simply assert that the intruder was shot down for its
unauthorized entry. Aggravating circumstances were claimed in each
instance.'33 Under elementary considerations of humanity, the world
community requires a state to refrain from destroying an unarmed civil
intruder without at least giving the pilot of the airliner, by appropriate
signals, an opportunity to either return to its authorized airspace or
follow the interceptors to land.
3 4
Second, there must be a demonstrable security necessity justifying
the offended state's decision to employ the military instrument.'35
Prima facie, a commercial passenger airliner which enters the airspace
of another state without authorization does not pose a threat to that
state's sovereignty justifying a response to the trespass with the use of
armed military force. 3 6 In the Libyan incident of 1973, Israel, invoking
the security necessity element raised by the United States in its memo-
rial in the Bulgarian incident, 37 asserted that the destruction of the
Libyan airliner was lawful because the airliner intruded into Israeli air-
space over a highly sensitive area of its territory and refused to heed
repeated warnings. 38 By finding that there was no justification for
shooting down the Libyan airliner,1 39 the ICAO impliedly rejected
Israel's proffered justification.
In the 1978 KAL incident, the Soviet Union, like Israel in 1973,
alleged a security necessity and a failure to heed warning signals as
133. See supra notes 77, 111, 128 and accompanying text.
134. See Memorial of the United States, supra note 83, at 210. See also Lissitzyn,
supra note 113, at 586-87. Professor Lissitzyn states that "[in its efforts to control the
movements of intruding aircraft the territorial sovereign must not expose the aircraft
and its occupants to unnecessary or unreasonably great danger-unreasonably great,
that is, in relation to the reasonably apprehended harmfulness of the intrusion." Id.
135. Hughes, supra note 76, at 620; Memorial of the United States, supra note 83, at
242.
136. Professor Lissitzyn maintains that "[in times of peace, intruding aircraft whose
intentions are known to the territorial sovereign to be harmless must not be attacked
even if they disobey orders to land, to turn back or to fly on a certain course." Lissitzyn,
supra note 113, at 587 (emphasis added).
137. Memorial of the United States, supra note 83, at 242.
138. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
139. See ICAO Council Resolution of June 4, 1973, supra note 122. On March 6,
1984, the Council of the ICAO adopted a resolution which similarly found no justifica-
tion for the use by the Soviet Union of armed military force against the unarmed South
Korean civil airliner. The resolution recognized that the use of armed force is a grave
threat to international civil aviation and is incompatible with the prescriptions and prac-
tices recognized and honored by the world community. ICAO Council Resolution of
March 6, 1984, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1984, at All, col. 3.
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justification for its action. 4" The captain and navigator of the Korean
airliner admitted that they received, understood and disregarded the
signals given by the Soviet interceptors."" This incident addresses the
issue left open in the memorial of the United States: Is it lawful for a
state to employ force against a civil aerial intruder when the offended
state asserts an articulable security necessity and the intruding airliner
refuses to comply with instructions from the intercepting aircraft? It is
submitted that under these circumstances the question must be an-
swered in the affirmative, with the following qualification: the pilot of
the intruding airliner must be given clear and unambiguous signals
that he is operating in unauthorized airspace and be afforded the op-
portunity either to return to his scheduled flight path or to follow the
interceptors to land. 4 2 In all of the prior incidents the offended states
alleged that the intruding airliners were given warnings from the in-
terceptors and that the intruders ignored these warnings.
Moreover, force may not be employed against an intruding airliner
unless all other means of terminating the unauthorized entry have
been exhausted. In the Bulgarian incident of 1955, Bulgaria admitted
140. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1978, at A15, col. 5. But see HOUSE COMM. ON COMMU-
NIST AGGRESSION, 83D CONG., 2D SEss., THIRD INTERIM REPORT, BALTIC STATES: A STUDY OF
THEIR ORIGIN AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT;- THEIR SEIZURE AND INCORPORATION INTO THE
U.S.S.R. 242-43, 372 (Comm. Print 1954), which describes the destruction of a Finnish
commercial airliner by Soviet fighter planes. On June 15, 1940, a Finnish Aero Company
commercial airliner enroute to Helsinki from Tallinn, Estonia was "attacked without
warning" by two Soviet fighter planes over the Gulf of Finland. Id. The crew and passen-
gers of the airliner were killed and the mailbags and other items from the wreckage
picked up by Estonian fishing boats at the scene were seized by a Soviet submarine crew.
"The presence of a Soviet submarine at the scene lent strength to the report that the
attack had been planned well in advance." Id. at 242.
It is submitted that the destruction of a commercial airliner on a domestic flight
without warning can never be viewed as a lawful use of force by the attacking state. Such
an act must be universally condemned as one of naked aggression if there is to be even a
modicum of hope in maintaining a minimum degree of world public order.
141. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1978, at Al, col. 5. Although the pilot subsequently
denied that he was given signals from the Soviet interceptors, it is submitted that his
acknowledgement at the time of the incident that internationally recognized signals were
received and ignored explains the minimal condemnation from the world community.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser at the time, acknowl-
edged that the Soviet interceptors had opened fire on the Korean airliner only after
other means had failed. Pearson, supra note 26, at 106.
142. Hughes, supra note 76, at 620. The international rules of the air provide:
When an interception is being made, the intercept control unit and the in-
tercepting aircraft should ... attempt to establish two-way communication with
the intercepted aircraft in a common language on the emergency frequency 121.5
MHz . .. intercepting aircraft should refrain from the use of weapons in all
cases of interception of civil aircraft.
Rules of the Air, annex 2, attachment A, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1186-87 (1983).
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that its air defense forces had failed to take all necessary measures to
force the airliner to change direction.143 It is submitted that the recog-
nition by Bulgaria of a failure to exhaust all necessary measures short
of force rendered it liable for the resulting damage. This limitation is
consistent with the recognized principle that international law con-
demns actions by states which unnecessarily or recklessly involve risk
to the lives or property of nationals of other states. While this limita-
tion does not absolutely prohibit the use of force as a remedy, it does
restrain a state from resorting to force when an effective alternative
exists which will prevent unnecessary destruction of lives and property.
III. THE SOVIET CLAIM OF LEGALITY UNDER THE LIMITATIONS
REGARDING TREATMENT OF CIVIL INTRUDERS
The Soviet Union alleges four reasons justifying its use of force
against Flight 007:
1. The airliner flew in Soviet airspace over militarily sensitive ar-
eas of Soviet territory without authorization; " '
2. The airliner refused to heed the repeated signals and warnings
communicated by the Soviet interceptor planes; 46
3. The Soviet interceptors did not know that the intruder was a
civil airliner because it was flying without navigation lights 46 and
4. The airliner was deliberately sent by the United States on an
intelligence-gathering mission over a sensitive area of Soviet
territory.'"
It is not disputed that Flight 007 intruded into Soviet airspace and
remained there for almost two and one half-hours. Nor is it disputed
that the Soviet Union enjoys exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory. Article 1 of the Chicago Convention recognizes
"that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-
space above its territory"'4 8 and this exclusive right is recognized as a
143. See KEESINGS, supra note 77, at 14359E.
144. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also infra note 150.
145. See supra note 33.
146. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1983, at A4, col. 5.
147. Id.
148. Chicago Convention, supra note 19, art. 1. The recognition of an exclusive right
in the territorial airspace is hardly a new concept. States have exerted competence in the
airspace above their territories since ancient times. Following an extensive review of the
historical claims that states have exercised over airspace, Professor John Cooper
concluded:
sovereign States have since Roman times created, recognized, regulated and pro-
tected certain exclusive private rights of the surface owner in usable space above
his lands. Accepting ... that such acts of the State can be exercised only by
virtue of its rights of sovereignty within its national territory, it follows that
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fundamental tenet of international law.'4 9
Flight 007 flew over the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Is-
land, two areas of Soviet territory that contain naval bases and other
military sites.5 0 Consistent with articles 6 and 9 of the Chicago Con-
vention, the Soviet Union may lawfully prohibit the aircraft of other
states from flying over its territory without express authorization. 5'
States claimed, held, and in fact exercised sovereignty in the airspace above
their national territories long prior to the age of flight, and that the recognition
of an existing territorial airspace status by the Paris Convention of 1919 was well
founded in law and history.
Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus Est Solum" in International Air Law, in
EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW 102 (1968). The first international agreement recogniz-
ing a state's exclusive sovereignty over its airspace was the International Convention
Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, art. 1, 3 U.S.T. 3768, 11
L.N.T.S. 173 (Paris Convention). Article 1 provides: "The High Contracting Parties
recognise that every power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory." Id. For a comprehensive discussion of the history and negotiations
behind the Paris Convention, see Cooper, United States Participation in Drafting Paris
Convention 1919, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW 137 (1968).
149. Hughes, supra note 76, at 595; Cooper, Air Transport and World Organization,
55 YALE L.J. 1191, 1195. Professor Cooper, who served as one of the advisors to the
United States Delegation to the 1944 Chicago Conference, stated:
On many points the Chicago Conference failed to agree. But no one chal-
lenged the doctrine of sovereignty of the airspace. It may certainly now be ac-
cepted as the primary rule of the international law of the air, and must be so
considered by any world organization. Any change in this doctrine can come into
effect only if the States concerned agree to surrender part of their recognized
sovereignty.
Id. See also B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 120 (1962).
150. See Middleton, supra note 26. The Soviet Union maintains launching sites for
ballistic missiles and tests these missiles in the two areas flown over. Pearson, supra note
26, at 118. The airliner also flew over the Soviet submarine pens at Petropavlosk on the
Kamchatka Penninsula, home port for an estimated thirty strategic missile submarines,
or about half the sea-based deterrent force of the Soviet Union. Id.
151. Article 6 of the Chicago Convention provides that scheduled international air
services may not operate in the airspace of another state "except with the special permis-
sion or other authorization of that State .... " Chicago Convention, supra note 19, art.
6. Article 9 provides that each State may uniformly prohibit the aircraft of other states
from flying over certain areas of its territory "for reasons of military necessity or public
safety." Id. art. 9. See also Cooper, supra note 149, at 1193:
Flowing from national sovereignty of the airspace, each State has complete
control . . . of the airspace over its territory . . . . In practice it has been uni-
versally admitted since World War I that the aircraft of one State can enter the
airspace over . . . another state, in time of peace, only when authorized. This
authorization may be by multilateral convention. . . bilateral convention. ., or
by permit issued by one State to a particular . . . aircraft of another State. In
every case, however, the authority to operate in the national airspace . . . must
be granted by direct license of the State concerned.
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Since the airliner was operating in Soviet airspace without authoriza-
tion, it must be concluded that Flight 007 violated the sovereign right
of the Soviet Union to exclude the airliner from operating in its
airspace.
The allegation that Flight 007 failed to respond to the internation-
ally recognized signals and warnings given by the Soviet interceptors is
not supported by evidence. The United States played to the Security
Council, without objection by the Soviet Union as to authenticity,
tapes of the conversations between the interceptor pilots and Soviet
ground control. 1 2 The tapes revealed that the interceptors made no
attempt to communicate with the airliner or to visually signal it to
land in accordance with internationally accepted procedures. The only
statement made by the pilot of an interceptor concerning communica-
tion with the airliner was that "the target isn't responding to IFF.1 5
3
IFF is an electronic interrogation signal by which military aircraft
identify friends or foes. Neither Flight 007 nor any other civilian air-
liner could have responded to the IFF signal, however, because com-
mercial airliners are not equipped to do so. 54
The Soviet Union refused to cooperate with the subsequent ICAO
investigation of the incident. 5 5 The ICAO Council concluded, in the
152. 38 U.N. SCOR (2471st mtg.), U.N. Doc. SiP.V. 2471, at 5 (prov. ed. 1983). Am-
bassador Kirkpatrick stated: "[wihat we are about to play back for you is the intercepted
tape of the actual [Soviet] air-to-ground reports . . . . Nothing was cut from this tape.
The recording was made on a voice actuated recorder and, therefore, it covers only those
periods of time when conversation was heard." Id.
153. Id. at 7. But see Pearson, supra note 26, at 120. The author states that the
reference to "I.F.F." came from a United States translation of the Russian language
transmissions; he notes that the final report issued by the ICAO investigating team
translated the same message as "the target isn't responding to the call." Id. (emphasis
added). He suggests that if the ICAO translation is correct, the Soviet pilot may well
have used the international hailing frequency in accordance with accepted interception
procedures, yet the Korean airliner did not respond. Id. Major General George J. Kee-
gan, Jr., now retired Chief of United States Air Force Intelligence, has stated that the
SU-15 that shot down Flight 007 was equipped with radio equipment compatible with
international hailing frequencies. Id. Contra Lohr, supra note 129. If, however, the So-
viet interceptors used the military call signal IFF, "it is clear the Russians believed they
were dealing with a hostile military aircraft." Pearson, supra note 26, at 120.
154. Ambassador Kirkpatrick maintained that "neither the Korean airliner nor any
other civilian airliner could have responded to IFF, because commercial aircraft are not
equipped to do so." Id. at 11.
155. In its Resolution of March 6, 1984, see supra note 139, the ICAO Council re-
solved that it:
[d]eeply deplore[dJ the Soviet failure to cooperate in the search and rescue ef-
forts of other involved States and the Soviet failure to cooperate with the ICAO
investigation of the incident by refusing to accept the visit of the investigation
team . . .and by failing so far to provide the Secretary General with informa-
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absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the crew of Flight 007
was unaware of the interception by Soviet fighters and that Soviet au-
thorities assumed Flight 007 was an intelligence aircraft without mak-
ing exhaustive efforts to identify it.' It is submitted that the Soviet
interceptors did not attempt to establish contact with the airliner by
the internationally accepted methods.
The allegation that Flight 007 was flying without navigation lights
is directly refuted by the tapes.'57 On three occasions the interceptors
reported seeing the airliner's navigation lights blinking.'" During the
course of the interception, the Soviet pilots flew behind, alongside and
in front of the airliner, coming as close as two kilometers at times. "
The United States maintained that, under the circumstances, it would
be easy to identify the unique and large outline of a Boeing 747 pas-
senger airliner. It asserted that:
either the Soviet pilot knew what he was firing at, or he did not
tion relevant to the investigation.
Id. (emphasis added).
156. See Summary of Findings and Conclusions of the ICAO Investigation Team, re-
printed in 22 I.L.M. 1192 (1983). But see Pearson, supra note 26, at 120, wherein the
author suggests that the Soviet interceptors did attempt to identify the intruder and
that the pilot of Flight 007 was aware of the interceptors.
157. See supra note 152, at 6-10 (transcript of the intercepted Soviet air-to-ground
reports).
158. Id. The crucial reference in the tapes to "lights" has been reported in the United
States as meaning that the Soviet pilot had seen Flight 007's lights. A different interpre-
tation, however, is just as plausible. See Pearson, supra note 26, at 120. At 1818:19
GMT, the pilot of the SU-15 reported to ground control that he was "executing" an
instruction given by ground control at 1818:12. At 1818:34, the pilot reported that "[t]he
[strobe] light is flashing." Id. Rather than being an acknowledgement that the Soviet
pilot had seen Flight 007's lights burning:
[Ilt is more likely that it was the SU-15's lights that were flashing, as the
next step in the interception procedure. Indeed, in the revised transcripts of the
transmissions released by the State Department on September 11, 1983, the pi-
lot reported just a few seconds later, at 1819:08, "They do not see me." Appar-
ently, the Soviet pilot was instructed to flash his lights; he did so, but the Ko-
rean pilot did not respond.
Id. The first explicit reference by the interceptors to the airliner's lights occurred at
1821:35 ("The target's light is blinking"), which was after a Soviet interceptor had at-
tempted radio contact (1813:16), flashing lights (1818:19) and firing warning shots along
the airliner's path (1820:49). Id. It seems reasonable to infer that, after the warning shots
were fired, the pilot of Flight 007 realized he was being intercepted and flashed his lights
as a signal that he was aware of the interceptors and would comply with their instruc-
tions. In the intervening six minutes before the airliner was destroyed, it slowed its speed
and changed direction, actions which the Soviet interceptors construed as taking evasive
maneuvers. Id.
159. See U.N. Doc., supra note 152, at 11. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at A6,
col. 5.
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know his target was a civilian passenger airliner. If the latter,
then he fired his deadly missiles without knowing or caring
what they would hit. Though he could easily have pulled up to
within some number of meters of the airliner to assure its iden-
tity, he did not bother to do so.'60
The Soviet authorities were aware of the intruding aircraft for
some two and one-half hours and ordered it to be destroyed minutes
before it was to enter international airspace over the Sea of Japan.'6 '
Since the evidence reveals that the airliner's navigation lights were il-
luminated and the sophisticated military interceptors were following
the aircraft long enough and close enough to identify it as a commer-
cial airliner, the Soviet Union was obligated, under principles of cus-
tomary international law and community expectations as evidenced by
states' practice and opinion in prior incidents, to observe elementary
considerations of humanity and refrain from employing an unnecessary
or disproportionate degree of force.162 In light of the fact that the in-
terceptors easily could have identified the intruder as a commercial air-
liner, it is submitted that the destruction of the airliner and the death
of 269 civilians was neither a necessary nor proportionate response to
the aerial trespass.
On September 16, 1983, an investigation of the incident was insti-
tuted at an extraordinary session of the ICAO Council.'6 The investi-
160. See U.N. Doc., supra note 152, at 11. The pilot of the intercepting Soviet fighter
plane was subsequently criticized in a Soviet magazine as being "trigger happy." Hal-
loran, Soviet Critical of Pilot Who Downed Korean Plane, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, at
Al, col. 1. Nevertheless, United States intelligence agencies later found no indication
that the Soviet interceptors knew Flight 007 was a commercial airliner before the attack.
Pearson, supra note 26, at 118. The SU-15 fighter that shot down Flight 007 was behind
and below the airliner at the time the missiles were fired. Identification would have been
most difficult from that position. Id.
161. 38 U.N. SCOR (2473d mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2473/Corr. 1 (1983), reprinted in
22 I.L.M. 1134 (1983). The Egyptian delegate stated that when the plane was hit, it was
very close to the edge of Soviet airspace and virtually over international waters. Id. It
must be noted, however, that United States intelligence agencies also must have been
aware of Flight 007's deviation well before it entered Soviet airspace:
There can be little doubt that on the night of August 31, the extremely
sophisticated, continuously vigilant U.S. and allied intelligence presence in the
area was cranked up to the maximum to monitor the impending test of a secret
and suspicious missile. All electronic eyes and ears were directed toward the
exact place where K.A.L. 007 first intruded in Soviet territory, at precisely the
time it was closest to the RC-135. . . . Far from slipping unnoticed, K.A.L. 007
had flown onto center stage.
Pearson, supra note 26, 117-18 (emphasis added).
162. See supra notes 20 and 21.
163. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
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gation included field visits to the United States, the Republic of Korea
and Japan." 4 The Soviet Union refused to accept the visit of the inves-
tigation team or to provide information which the Council deemed
relevant.16
On March 6, 1984, the Council adopted a resolution based on the
investigation report.16 6 While acknowledging that the precise cause of
the deviation could not be conclusively established, the resolution
stated that "no evidence was found to indicate that the deviation was
premeditated or that the crew was at any time aware of the flight's
deviation. 1
67
The allegation that Flight 007 was fulfilling a spy mission for the
United States is hardly credible. The intelligence-gathering arsenal of
the United States includes state-of-the-art satellites, ground stations,
ships, submarines and reconnaissance aircraft."' There seems to be lit-
tle need for the use of commercial airliners of another state as intelli-
164. ICAO News Release, Dec. 13, 1983.
165. See ICAO Council Resolution of March 6, 1984, supra note 139.
166. Id. On Sept. 12, 1983, the United Nations Security Council failed to adopt a
resolution which deeply deplored the destruction of Flight 007 because the Soviet Union,
a Permanent Member of the Security Council, vetoed it. However, the resolution was
approved by the United States, Great Britain, France, Jordan, Malta, the Netherlands,
Pakistan, Zaire and Togo. The resolution declared "that such use of armed force against
international civil aviation is incompatible with the norms governing international be-
havior and elementary considerations of humanity." U.N. Doc. S/15966/Rev. 1 (1983),
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1146 (1983). It is significant that while the Soviet Union refused to
cooperate with the ICAO Council in its investigation or to adopt the Security Council
resolution condemning the use of force against civil aircraft, the Soviet Government, in
1973, accused Israel of committing a criminal act of international terrorism for its armed
attack against the Libyan airliner and urged the ICAO to strongly condemn Israel's "bar-
baric act." See 22 I.L.M. 1130 (1983).
167. See ICAO Council Resolution of March 6, 1984, supra note 139. There is cir-
cumstantial evidence which suggests that the crew of the Korean airliner was aware of its
intrusion. Less than one minute after the Soviet interceptors fired warning shots in the
path of the airliner, the interceptors reported seeing the "target's" lights flashing. Within
the next five minutes, the airliner slowed down and changed direction. Pearson, supra
note 26, at 120. It is also significant to note that during this time the pilot of Flight 007
reported to Tokyo air-traffic control that he had climbed to 35,000 feet from his previous
altitude of 33,000 feet. There had in fact been no such ascent. Id.
168. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1983, at A6, col. 2. See also Pearson, supra note 26, at
113-18. Although it may be extremely doubtful that KAL 007 was intentionally sent on a
preplanned mission over Soviet territory to gather intelligence information itself, there
are a number of significant unanswered questions which should be addressed. The fact
that a major Soviet nuclear test was scheduled that fateful night at the exact spot over
which Flight 007 intruded casts doubt on United States allegations that it was at all
relevant times unaware of Flight 007's deviation. "The accumulating weight of evidence
discrediting official U.S. government explanations of the KAL 007 incident demand [sic]
a full-scale Congressional investigation." Id.
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gence-gathering instruments. Of course, any state which used or ac-
tively encouraged such a strategy must share the responsibility for any
damage or injury resulting from unnecessarily exposing civilian lives to
potential danger and violating international prescriptions."0 But in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the allegation that Flight 007
was engaged in an intelligence-gathering mission must be rejected.
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet interceptors "made
all possible efforts to secure identification of the intruding aircraft"
170
or that the crew of Flight 007 was aware of any of the interceptions
reported by the Soviet Union.'7 1 Under these circumstances, as the
ICAO Council Resolution stated, such use of armed force "constitutes
a violation of international law, and . . . is a grave threat to the safety
of international civil aviation, and is incompatible with the norms gov-
erning international behaviour and with the rules. . . enshrined in the
Chicago Convention and its Annexes and with elementary considera-
tion of humanity."'
17 2
The Liberian delegate eloquently placed the incident in its proper
169. - See, e.g., Garcia Case, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119 (1928); Corfu Channel, 1949
I.C.J. 4; Hughes, supra note 76, at 620. See also Lissitzyn, supra note 113, at 587. Profes-
sor Lissitzyn stated:
This standard [restraining a state from using armed force against civil air-
craft] may be regarded as a special application to aviation of a more general
standard of international law restraining states, in the exercise of their otherwise
undoubted sovereign powers, from unnecessarily or unreasonably endangering
the lives and property of foreign nationals.
Id. If it is found that the United States was aware of the deviation of Flight 007 and that
it had the time and the means to communicate with the crew to warn them before Soviet
airspace was violated and did not do so, then the United States must bear some respon-
sibility for the tragedy that ensued because it too would have violated the customary
international proscriptions against unnecessarily exposing civilian lives to potential dan-
ger. As one author has explained:
Congress owes it to the passengers of K.A.L. 007, their families, the people
of the United States and the world community to conduct a full and thorough
investigation, to let the truth be known. In a democratic society, there must be
limits to the damage that can be inflicted in the name of "national security."
We cannot control the paranoia of a Soviet society that shoots when in
doubt, whether on orders from above or on impulse from below. We can and
should, however, take responsibility for our own contribution to this tragedy and
the tensions, fears and international disorder that it has promoted.
Pearson, supra note 26, at 124.
170. See Summary of Findings and Conclusions of the ICAO Investigation Team,
supra note 156.
171. Id.
172. ICAO Council Resolution of March 6, 1984, supra note 139.
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perspective at the Security Council's special session:
As long as all nations, large and small, rich and poor, super-
power and lesser power, share a common living space we also
share a responsibility to the world community regarding our
actions and conduct. If we are truly and sincerely working for
peace how can the Soviet action be convincingly explained?
Peace is not achieved by bullets or grandiose statements issued
in the assemblies, congresses and presidiums of the world, but
rather on the level of daily human interaction. The Soviet
Union owes the entire world, and the Korean people in particu-
lar, a factual explanation of the incident, in the name of
human decency and dignity. . . . Everyone who has flown in
an aircraft-including everyone in this chamber-can identify
with the fate of the helpless air passengers, with no warning
having been given, so swift is the act of modern warfare. We
are left behind to agonize over their fate and to hold our
breath, wondering whether this will happen again. In the name
of our common humanity, in the name of international law and
order, we ask the Soviet Union to give the world the whole
story, realizing as we do from their own Tolstoy's War and
Peace that the worst thing is for good men to keep silent when
a wrong has been done."'3
Gerard Michael McCarthy
173. 38 U.N. SCOR (2471st mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2471, at 36-38 (prov. ed. 1983),
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1126-27 (1983).
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